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Abstract 
 
The 2008 global economic crisis galvanized the debate on neo-developmentalism as the 
pendulum of economic thinking began to swing away from neoliberalism. The current shift in the 
modalities of market governance mainly deals with the ways through which industrial policies 
can be crafted in a more open-economy setting. Accordingly, the post-crisis literature turns a keen 
eye on the state’s developmental role in the research and development (R&D) sector in an age of 
‘bit-driven’ global political economy. On that note, the nature, properties, and limits of state 
policies of emerging powers in this particular realm are becoming increasingly central but remain 
an understudied theme. This article discusses the R&D policies of Turkey from a state capacity 
perspective and questions the rationale of those policies by linking the state’s transformative 
capacity to the discussions on distributive pressures. Drawing on twenty-one in-depth semi-
structured interviews, this article assesses Turkey’s R&D policies.   
 
Key words: governing the market, Turkish political economy, R&D sector, state capacity, neo-
developmentalism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The state has made a strong comeback after the global financial crisis in 2008 as the 
liberal economies plunged into a severe turmoil whereas state-led heterodox economic 
models seemed to survive the unprecedented shock. 1  The crisis put a break to the 
ascendance of neoliberal globalization as the reigning ideology and conventional 
economic policy paradigm over the last three decades. During the heyday of 
neoliberalism in the 1990s, the state was perceived as a ‘problem’ for the efficient 
functioning of the markets. Neoclassical political economists argued that rational private 
actors operating in efficient markets are more capable than states in enhancing national 
economic performance. Neoliberalization was seen as the most efficient way for 
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sustainable economic growth and human development. Therefore, deregulation, 
privatization, and reduction of the state were promoted as the founding pillars of the so-
called Washington Consensus.2 This conventional wisdom was forcefully supported by 
international organizations like the IMF, WTO, and World Bank as several developing 
economies were advised to implement radical liberalization policies through structural 
adjustment programs.3  
 
A comparative analysis, however, suggests that countries that outperformed their peers 
over the last thirty years in terms of development and integration into the international 
economy are those that implemented heterodox economic policies.4 As Dani Rodrik puts 
it, ‘globalization’s chief beneficiaries are not necessarily those with the most open 
economic policies’. 5  Drawing from ample empirical evidence, political economists 
increasingly concentrated on the role of ‘state capacity’ in the formulation, 
implementation, and change in growth-enhancing economic policies. The recent literature 
demonstrates that state capacity is a precondition, not an obstacle to improve economic 
development performance.6  
 
The 2008 global economic crisis galvanized the debate on state capacity as the pendulum 
began to swing away from neoliberalism.7 The current shift in the modalities of state 
intervention, however, goes beyond the ‘governing the market’ approaches that put 
emphasis on selective industrialization and protectionist foreign trade policies.8 Given 
that the ‘developmental space’ for emerging countries has shrunk dramatically, 9  the 
current conceptual and empirical work mainly deals with the ways through which 
industrial policies can be crafted in a more open-economy setting.10 One particular area 
that emerges for states to intervene in the functioning of the market and achieving their 
developmentalist goals is the realm of technology. Accordingly, the post-crisis literature, 
in particular, turns a keen eye on the role of state in fostering research and development 
(R&D) in the age of ‘bit-driven’ global political economy.11 It appears that ‘R&D is the 
new industrial policy’ of our age12 and several states adopt R&D strategies in a way that 
can be considered ‘developmental state [policies] in disguise’.13 Mariana Mazzucato, for 
instance, demonstrates that ‘the state has been behind most technological revolutions and 
periods of long-run growth.14 This is why an “entrepreneurial state” is needed to engage 
in risk taking and the creation of a new vision, rather than just fixing market failures’. On 
that note, the nature, properties, and limits of state policies of emerging powers in this 
particular realm are becoming increasingly central but remain an understudied theme. 
What kinds of R&D policies do the states in emerging powers implement and what are 
the developmental consequences of these policies?  
 
Having taken the conceptual and empirical lacuna into consideration, this study discusses 
the R&D policies of Turkey, as it constitutes an illustrative case for broader literature on 
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state capacity, which also has implications on the discussions on populism. To begin 
with, a single party government has been ruling Turkey for more than 15 years, which 
makes the country an important case in terms of political stability and leadership that is 
constantly highlighted in the developmental state literature. Second, the Turkish state 
adopted a new set of policies in the post-2008 period, especially in the R&D sector, to 
shift the production structures of private firms and improve the place of the country in the 
hierarchy of the international economy. Third, Turkey has become a striking emerging 
power that has demonstrative effects for a group of countries understudied in the recent 
literature. Last, a detailed investigation of the Turkish state’s transformative performance 
signal that populist motivations prevail in the formulation and implementation of R&D 
policies. As known, the prevalence of populist tendencies in a policy-making process is 
not only a traditional problem in Turkey but also a common concern in several 
developing countries. Given the fact that R&D policy-making is more often than not 
considered to be a technical and a rational process, the questioning of populist 
inclinations in relation to state capacity provide important insights on the broader 
discussion on imminent distributive pressures in large developing countries.   
 
The article proceeds as follows: The second part lays out the conceptual framework. The 
third part reviews the contemporary Turkish political economy with particular reference 
to the state’s R&D policies. Drawing on in-depth elite interviews conducted with 
bureaucrats and relevant stakeholders, and employing ample descriptive statistics, the 
fourth part turns a critical eye on the empirical developments in the post-2008 Turkey. 
The final part concludes the paper by extrapolating certain lessons for the broader 
literature. In regards to the interview method, twenty-one interviews are conducted in 
Turkey during November 2014 and June 2016 in different time periods. Except for one, 
which was conducted over the phone, all interviews were conducted face-to-face. 
Nineteen interviews lasted for more than half an hour and nine of them more than an 
hour. Purposive sampling in the form of ‘information-oriented selection’ is used as the 
main sampling strategy.15 The goal of the strategy has been to ‘maximize the utility of 
information from small samples and single cases,’ whereby ‘cases are selected on the 
basis of expectations about their information content’.16  
 
Conceptual framework: Transformation of the neo-developmental state 
 
The state’s role in the economy rests on a crucial question: ‘How could we square a state 
that was strong, but not predatory, credible to the private sector but not captured’.17 The 
developmental state framework offers two crucial criteria to determine the social 
foundations of the state,18 which we can classify as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of 
state capacity.19 The ‘internal’ qualification for assessing state capacity is the degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy.20 The level of insulation of bureaucracy vis-à-vis private interest 
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groups reflects the degree of state autonomy. 21 In addition to autonomy, the internal 
capacity of the state depends on the degree of public bureaucracy’s meritocratic 
qualifications. Accordingly, internal capacity is measured with reference to the 
approximation of the existing bureaucratic structures to the Weberian ideal type. If the 
bureaucracy is organized in line with meritocratic recruitment, objective career 
promotion, and performance-based monitoring procedures, the state in question is more 
likely to have autonomy vis-à-vis economic interest groups.22 It also decreases the rent-
seeking motivations on the part of the bureaucratic cadres and helps to avoid ‘state 
capture’. The crucial point, however, is that bureaucratic insulation is different from 
isolation. Both Peter Evans’s ‘embedded autonomy’ concept 23  and Linda Weiss’s 
‘governed interdependence’ framework 24  necessitate an active bureaucracy that has 
regular and institutionalized deliberation channels with private economic elites in order to 
overcome collective action problems (see below). As put forward, state bureaucrats must 
be able to ‘foray outside the state with good coats rather than huddle inside insulated 
structures’. 25 Yet, this interaction should not pave the way to degenerating and rent-
seeking patterns of the state-business relationship. The only way for sustaining 
insulation-integration balance is to build a Weberian bureaucratic structure exempt from 
arbitrary political interference. Thus, in certain contexts the term ‘autonomy’ directly 
refers to the interplay between political elites and bureaucrats by questioning the 
bureaucracy’s relative decision-making power vis-à-vis the political leadership. 26  As 
Peter Evans argues, ‘in the absence of a coherent, self-orienting, Weberian sort of 
administrative structure, embeddedness will almost certainly have deleterious effects’.27  
 
The ‘external’ capacity of a state refers to the ability to manage its economic environment 
and its relations with business groups. One can define two ideal types of state-business 
relations as heuristic analytical devices. On the one edge of the spectrum, there is the 
integrationist/collaborative type of state-business relations, whereas the rent-seeking type 
takes place at the polar opposite. The integrationist/collaborative type mainly refers to 
dense interpersonal and institutionalized networks that motivate and guide private actors 
to make productive use of state support. 28  The rent-seeking type of state-business 
relations, on the other edge, refers to a sub-optimal equilibrium in which bilateral 
interactions lead to the waste of public resources for the sake of inefficient private 
purposes, which Bhagwati labelled as ‘directly unproductive profit-seeking.’29  
 
Three factors inform the modus operandi of the public-private relationship. The first one 
concerns information flows. High-quality information flows facilitate collective goal 
setting by decreasing the information asymmetry between the parties through shaping 
expectations and signalling the credibility of mutual commitments.30 The lack of dense 
policy networks entwined by regular and high quality information exchange is likely to 
increase the motivation of private actors to squander public resources. The second factor 
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concerns credibility. In the absence of credible commitments on the part of the state, 
private actors are less likely to respond to the state signals. As argued, ‘enacting policies 
that lack credibility can be worse than doing nothing at all’.31 The problem of many 
developing states is low government credibility, which stems from frequent changes in 
government policies. 32  The weak government credibility directs market players to 
prioritize only short-term interests rather than long-term productive commitments to 
handle the imminent risks emerging from ambiguous state policies. The third, and final, 
factor concerns reciprocity. Establishing information networks and building interpersonal 
trust is sustainable only if the relationship is based on solid institutional foundations.33 
The state’s external capacity, therefore, stems from its ability to craft effective 
performance and monitoring criteria in return for credible commitments to private 
actors. 34  Otherwise, the subsidies and other support mechanisms might enfeeble the 
conditionality-based performance and inform corrupt practices.  
 
The conventional characteristics of a developmental state—though still relevant—must 
be updated so as to adjust for the current stage of global capitalism, which Peter Evans 
aptly called ‘bit-driven knowledge economy’.35 The new strands of development theories 
acknowledge the increasing importance of state capacity in setting collective goals, 
fostering ideas, and promoting the capabilities of individuals, particularly in the realm of 
high technology production in the age of the bit-driven knowledge economy—the 
backbone of which is the R&D sector. For instance, new growth theory suggests that the 
direction of development is shifting from the accumulation of physical capital to the ideas 
and knowledge. Accordingly, on-going paradigm shift avoids the constraint of 
diminishing returns and enables increasing returns to scale.36 The capabilities approach 
also underlines the centrality of deliberative institutions that promote human capabilities 
and foster free and creative thinking so as to exploit new development opportunities.37 
This suggests that new approaches highlight the increasing centrality of state capacity 
because ‘ensuring maximum possible access to ideas that are tools for the further 
expansion of knowledge requires active state involvement, sometimes in opposition to the 
private owners of those assets’.38 As the argument goes, ‘to facilitate 21st century bit-
driven growth, the state must be agile, active, resourceful and able to act independently of 
private interests whose returns depend on restricting the flow of knowledge’.39 Thus, a 
state’s ‘external’ capacity, in particular, must rely on an extended understanding of 
‘embeddedness’ including universities, different divisions of public bureaucracy, 
business actors, and broader segments of civil society.40 The rest of the paper applies the 
conceptual framework to the Turkish case in the R&D sector. First, however, we shall 
provide a brief overview of the Turkish political economy and the state’s R&D policies in 
the next section. 
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The political economy of Turkey’s R&D policies 
 
The political economy of Turkey has undergone a considerable transformation over the 
last fifteen years. Following the February 2001 crisis, the coalition government of the 
time overhauled Turkey’s fiscal and financial regime along with the creation of new pro-
reform coalitions. The transformation strongly showed a quality of a paradigm change 
since the state’s fiscal profligacy and lax financial supervision were replaced with a 
‘regulatory state paradigm’ that precipitated strong fiscal and financial regulation. 41 
Following the crisis, a bold and comprehensive reform package was put into 
implementation, the aim of which was to fundamentally [transform] the functioning of 
the state through a three-pronged approach: fiscal consolidation, financial restructuring, 
and structural reforms to ensure the state’s fiscal and financial sustainability. In addition, 
the monetary policy moved toward inflation targeting as the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey was given operational independence in maintaining price stability.  
 
On 3 October 2002, in the first national elections following the economic crisis, Turkish 
voters swept aside established parties. As a result, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi/Justice and Development Party) ended up with a two-third majority in the 
parliament, which put a decisive end to the long-lasting interlude of shaky coalition 
governments. The elections constituted a new critical juncture in the fortune of the 
economic reforms enacted in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis.42 The AKP leadership 
owned the IMF-induced reform program along with a quest for EU-membership, which 
in turn, paved the way for the consolidation of a reformist virtuous cycle. The AKP’s 
adherence to the main contours of the reform program laid the groundwork for the 
enhancement of Turkey’s state capacity in the regulatory realm. The regulatory 
institutions to ensure fiscal and financial discipline performed their functions properly, 
which in turn, reduced the public debt and budget deficits dramatically (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Turkey’s main macroeconomic indicators 
 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (US $ billions, c. p.) 304.9 482 649 617 731.6 774 786.3 823 800.1 
GDP Per Capita (US $) 4,565 7,036 9,247 8,561 10,003 10,428 10,459 10,822 10,404 
GDP Growth (%) 5.3 8.4 4.6 -4.7 9 8.5 2.2 4.3 2.9 
Investment (% GDP) 17.4 21.4 21.8 17.2 18.9 22.1 20.6 20.6 20.5 
Savings (% GDP) 15.5 16.0 15.5 13.2 13.5 14.4 14.5 13.4 14.9 
Imports (US $ billions) 69.3 116.8 170.1 140.9 185.5 240.8 236.5 251.7 242.2 
Exports (US $ billions) 47.3 73.5 107.3 102.1 113.9 135 152.5 151.8 157.6 
CAB (% GDP) -2.47 -4.57 -5.75 -2.24 -6.49 -9.7 -6 -7.9 -5.8 
FDI (US $ billions) 1.7 10 22 8.6 9.1 16.2 13.3 12.5 12.6 
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -8.8 -1.3 -1.62 -5.5 -3.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.2 -1.3 
Total Public Debt (% GDP) 74 59.6 46.5 40 46.1 42.4 39.2 36.1 33.5 
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Unemployment 10.3 9.5 9.2 13.1 11.1 9.1 8.4 9 9.9 
Source: TUIK and CBRT 
 
 
The regulatory state policies, however, were not complemented by a pronounced 
industrial strategy since prudently crafted and patiently implemented capacity enhancing 
policies were not included in the policy mix to ensure the transformation of the 
production and trade structures.43 Turkey’s acute current account deficit reverberate the 
structural economic problems lying beneath the surface (see table 1, rows 6-8).  
 
The transformations taking place in the post-crisis global political economy, however, 
triggered a reshuffling in the perspectives of Turkish policy-makers as well. Since 2009, 
the government has tried to formulate a hands-on approach regarding industrial policy to 
address poor technology performance. First, the Turkish Industrial Strategy Document 
was adopted in 2011 under the auspices of the MoSIT, along with the involvement of the 
relevant public and private bodies. The long-term goal of the industrial plan is to position 
Turkey as ‘the production base of Eurasia in medium and high-tech products’. In line 
with this overall objective, three basic strategic targets have been determined: (1) to 
increase the ratio of mid and high-tech sectors in production and exports, (2) to transition 
to high value-added products in low-tech sectors, and (3) to increase the weight of 
companies that can continuously improve their skills. Thus, industrial policy objectives 
are designed to target Turkey’s recalcitrant current account deficit through high value-
added products, which is expected to decrease the dependence of exports on imports.  
 
The second aspect of Turkey’s new industrial strategy involves state investments in R&D 
sectors. The state has channelled considerable amounts of funding into research and 
innovation activities over the last decade. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (R&D intensity) has expanded substantially in comparison to the 
1990s and crossed the 1 percent threshold in 2014 (Table 2). The funds allocated to the 
private sector through innovation governance organizations, including the MoSIT, 
TÜBİTAK, KOSGEB, and the newly established regional development agencies 44 
increased dramatically. The increase continued despite the negative impact of the global 
economic crisis on the Turkish economy.45 In addition, there has been a technopark boom 
in Turkey over the 2000s. Being infrastructural investments, technoparks are usually 
established within a university campus with the aim of enhancing innovation through 
exploiting geographical proximity. While there were only two technoparks in Turkey in 
2001, the number skyrocketed to 63 in 2016.46 Moreover, R&D centers founded by the 
private sector via the ‘R&D law’, which was enacted in 2008. While there were 300 
R&D centers in December 2016, December 2016, more than 600 centers were in 
operation as of September 2017.47 Turkey also heavily invested in the human capacity 
employed in the R&D sector. The number of total R&D personnel, for instance, increased 
 8 
from 76,074 in 2000 to almost 200,000 in 2013. This corresponds to an increase in R&D 
personnel per 10,000 total employment from 14 to 45 during 2002-2014 (Table 2).48  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Turkey’s main science, technology and innovation (STI) indicators 
 
1990 1995 2002 2004 2007 2009 2011 2013 2014 
R&D Intensity (%) 0.33 0.37 0.53 0.52 0.72 0.85 0.86 0.95 1.01 
GERD funded by industry 
(%) - - - 36.2 46.2 41 45.8 48.9 50.9 
GERD funded by 
government (%) - - - 38.7 31.9 34 29.2 26.6 26.3 
GERD funded by higher 
education (%)  - - - 20 17.5 20.3 20.8 20.4 18.4 
GERD performed by 
business enterprise sector 
(%) 20.4 23.6 28.7 24.2 41.3 40 43.2 47.5 49.8 
GERD performed by 
government sector (%) 9.8 7.4 7 8 10.6 12.6 11.3 10.4 9.7 
GERD performed by 
higher education sector (%) 69.8 69 64.3 67.9 48.2 47.4 45.5 42.1 40.5 
R&D personnel per 10,000 
total employment - - 14 20 31 36 40 46 45 
Number of patents granted 
by Turkish Patent Institute - 763 1784 1936 4790 5610 6539 8925 8530 
Source: TUIK, TÜBİTAK, and Turkish Patent Institute 
 
In short, Turkey achieved improvements in the basic STI indicators during the AKP era. 
There have also been significant increases in the R&D funds allocated to the private 
sector. The state occupied a central stage in this transformation. How can we assess the 
implications and possible consequences of the Turkish state’s involvement in the 
economy in terms of the trajectory of its neo-developmental credentials? The relevant 
literature on the Turkish political economy remains silent on these and other related 
crucial questions. Therefore, the next part aims to address this gap by relying on the 
conceptual framework delineated in the first part.  
 
 
An assessment of the Turkish state’s neo-developmental turn 
 
The Turkish government has taken certain steps over the last decade in order to promote 
technological capacity of the economy. The first step to this end concerns the 
institutionalization of the developmental mentality in the R&D sector. To begin with, the 
Supreme Council for Science and Technology (SCST), which is the highest-ranking STI 
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policy-making body in Turkey, has become fully operationalized. In fact, the Council, 
which set out to conduct two meetings each year only held three meetings in fourteen 
years until 1997. The Council could only meet once in a year during 1997-2004. With the 
emphasis placed upon the Council by the AKP governments, the Council meets two times 
annually since 2005. In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade has been replaced 
with the new MoSIT in 2011 to improve the coordination among acting state institutions 
in the economic realm. The main actors of the innovation system, including TÜBİTAK, 
KOSGEB, and the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) were connected to this newly 
established Ministry. 
 
Second, and equally important, new key legislation has been enacted to promote R&D, 
and to better monitor and enhance the effectiveness of the implemented policies. As such, 
the ‘R&D law’ was promulgated in 2008 leading to the establishment of R&D centers by 
the private sector. The government also amended the ‘Technopark Law’ more than once 
to further encourage high-tech production. The creation of ‘Technology Transfer Offices’ 
is set as a requirement in the law, and their establishment is incentivized to ignite the 
university-industry collaboration, a common practice of developmental states. Third, a 
new regulation on the surveillance of state subsidies was enacted to outline the principles 
and procedure to regulate the state incentives in line with the EU acquis. The State Aids 
Monitoring and Supervision Board has been set up with the law, and the General 
Directorate of State Aids has been created under the Undersecretariat of Treasury to carry 
out the Board’s secretariat services. Fourth, a new unit has been founded within the 
MoSIT to conduct the impact analysis of the allocated governmental support funds. Some 
indexes have also been created to assess the main players’ performance in the innovation 
system. Accordingly, ‘The Entrepreneurial and Innovative University Index’ has been 
prepared under the auspices of TÜBİTAK since 2012, and the MoSIT has been 
performing the ‘Technology Development Zones Performance Index’ study since 2013. 
 
The major developments reflecting the neo-developmentalist ambitions of the Turkish 
state notwithstanding, a number of factors have constrained Turkey’s state capacity. 
While some of the development-restraining factors are directly related to the AKP 
governments’ undertakings, some others are deeply rooted in the political economy 
structure of the Turkish innovation system. These two dynamics are also not always 
mutually exclusive. These problems can be analysed in a concise manner with respect to 
bureaucratic autonomy, the monitoring and the steering of the R&D funds, and the 
modalities of public-private coordination.  
 
 
The question of bureaucratic autonomy 
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The interview data and the relevant empirical evidence suggest that significant problems 
prevail concerning bureaucratic autonomy in Turkey. This political interference had 
negative spillover effects on state capacity. TÜBİTAK, which is founded in 1963 and 
currently acts as the secretariat of the SCST, is a case in point. 49  The institution 
constitutes one of the well-established innovation governance organizations in Turkey. 
TÜBİTAK is actively involved in all dimensions of the STI policy-making processes 
from initial design to implementation. TÜBİTAK is also the national coordination office 
for the EU Research Framework Programs. Thus, it plays a leading role as the ‘nodal 
agency’ in the Turkish innovation system. In the relevant legislation, TÜBİTAK is 
defined as ‘autonomous organization’ in terms of administrative and financial affairs. The 
Science Board governs the organization by electing its own members and nominating the 
President of TÜBİTAK. While the members are then appointed by the Prime Minister, 
the President of TÜBİTAK is appointed by the President of Turkey following the 
approval of the Prime Minister. Before 2011, TÜBİTAK was directly connected to the 
Prime Ministry. Since the foundation of the MoSIT in 2011, TÜBİTAK is now connected 
to the MoSIT.  
 
The fact that the Prime Minister and the President are involved in the election processes 
of the leading cadre of TÜBİTAK raises questions about the organization’s autonomy. 
Although the structure does not immediately suggest such involvement, the evidence 
suggests that the governments intervened in the workings of TÜBİTAK over the 2000s. 
This is first and foremost evident in the hotly debated amendment process of 
TÜBİTAK’s foundation law.50 Shortly after its rise to power in 2002, the AKP attempted 
to amend the law. With the foreseen amendment, the Prime Minister would have had the 
authority to directly appoint the Science Board members and the President of TÜBİTAK 
for one time only. The amendment was debated in the parliament in  October 2003. 
Despite the objections of opposition parties, it was adopted and then passed to the 
President for final approval. The President exercised his veto power by noting that the 
amendment undermined TÜBİTAK’s autonomy by way of granting excessive powers to 
the Prime Minister.51 The government proposed the same amendment two months later. 
The amendment was passed in the parliament. As the President did not have a second 
veto power, he approved the new proposal –Law 5016. However, the law could not even 
remain in execution for two months. As more than a hundred opposition deputies filed an 
appeal to the Constitutional Court, the Court stopped the law’s execution. The same 
process re-occurred two years later in 2005. Law 5376 was eventually put into force, but 
was overturned by the Constitutional Court. Finally, the law was amended in 2008 when 
one of the senior ruling party members became the new President in 2007.  
 
One major consequence of the government’s interference with TÜBİTAK was the change 
in TÜBİTAK’s leading cadre during the first half of the 2000s. In February 2003, the 
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Science Board of TÜBİTAK re-elected its then incumbent president for his second term 
in office, and later on elected six new members to the Board. The Prime Ministry was 
notified about the decisions. However, the then Prime Minister did not pass the 
incumbent’s re-election to the President, and also did not approve the new members’ 
election.52 Following the refusal, the Science Board was unable to hold its meeting and 
obtain a quorum of decision. Meanwhile, Prime Minister appointed six new Science 
Board members within the one-month period when the first amendment was put into 
force and expelled by the Constitutional Court. The new Board held its first meeting in 
January 2004 where the majority of the former members were replaced with the new 
ones.53 The new members also elected the new president of the Council.54 During this 
turbulent process, four vice-presidents of TÜBİTAK resigned from their posts by noting 
that the organization had been completely politicized.55  
 
The interventions were not limited to TÜBİTAK. Among the important ones, there have 
been significant regulatory changes in the election procedure of TÜBA members. Being 
the scientific brain trust in Turkey, TÜBA provides science-based consultancy service to 
governing elites in the shaping of science policies. Previously, TÜBA was electing its 
own members. Via a statutory decree published in the official gazette on 27 August 2011, 
TÜBA members were to be elected by TÜBA, the Council of Ministers, and the General 
Assembly of the Council of Higher Education. Each organization was said to elect one-
third of the members. After the opposition harshly criticized the amendment due to the 
politicization of the Academy, the Council of Ministers was removed from the election 
cycle to be replaced with the Science Board of TÜBİTAK. 56  Currently, TÜBA, 
TÜBİTAK, and Council of Higher Education are electing TÜBA members. The re-
assigning of the role from the Council of Ministers to TÜBİTAK did not satisfy the 
opposition’s concerns. As mentioned, TÜBİTAK is itself has been highly politicized 
throughout the 2000s, thus the amendment did not mean much in practice. In fact, almost 
fifty TÜBA members submitted their resignation to protest the political intervention in 
the end of the day.  
 
The bureaucratic apparatus’ lack of autonomy vis-à-vis political leadership is a defining 
trait of the Turkish state’s internal structure.57 This has continued to be the case during 
the 2000s –within the context of the independent regulatory agencies58 and the economic 
bureaucracy.59 In this respect, the AKP’s intervention to key innovation agencies has not 
only represented a continuum with the past, but also reflected the overall tendency in 
domains other than STI. The important question is, how exactly the interferences have 
influenced R&D policy-making processes and R&D policy in Turkey during the 2000s? 
The interview evidence strongly suggests that political interference with innovation 
organizations affects the policy-making processes drastically in Turkey in various 
interrelated ways. To begin with, when an organization’s leading cadre changes due to 
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political interference or other reasons, each new cadre aims to pursue an agenda that is 
clearly different from the existing one. More often than not, the new agenda neither 
expands on the previous one, nor takes the pros and cons of the existing implementation 
into consideration. Therefore, the learning effect in agenda-setting remains very weak. 
For example, with the coming to power of the new government in 2002, and the 
subsequent shift in TÜBİTAK’s leading cadre, there have been major discontinuities in 
the R&D policy design in Turkey. This includes the spatial distribution of the R&D 
funds, as well as the funds’ sectoral focus.60  
 
The renouncement of the ‘Vision 2023’ project in the first half of the 2000s exemplifies 
the point. 61  As the first-ever national science and technology foresight exercise in 
Turkey, the Vision 2023 project was conducted at the turn of the 2000s under 
TÜBİTAK’s leadership.62 The project’s two primary goals were to suggest long-term STI 
policies and to determine strategic sectors for R&D investment. The project was unique 
in terms of embeddedness, as more than 2,000 public and private actors from different 
sectors took part in it. Based on evidence and collectiveness, certain strategic fields and 
sectors were identified for Turkey and numerous policy prescriptions were put forward. 
The SCST, the highest-ranking STI policy-making body in Turkey, approved the project 
in 2005. However, with the subsequent shifts in TÜBİTAK’s cadre, the project’s targets 
were not taken into account in practice. Its key priorities, projections, and suggestions 
were not reflected in the Council’s subsequent decisions and they were also not taken into 
account by the short- and medium-term plans. 63  A previous high-ranking bureaucrat 
noted, ‘as the government changed, [the new governing elite] cancelled [the Vision 2023 
project]’.64 Second, in the absence of bureaucratic autonomy, arbitrary interference paved 
the way for ‘top-down policy-making’, further undermining the Turkish state’s 
developmentalist agenda. The same high-ranking bureaucrat, for instance, emphasized 
the dominance of the ‘top-down approach’ in the following way: ‘many of our policies 
emerge once a politician gives the idea and bureaucrats conduct the complementary 
preparation. Let’s say an idea occurs to the [politician] one night, he says let’s do this. 
We cannot do the prior analysis to see if [the proposed policy] is doable or not’. 65 
Another previous bureaucrat noted in a similar fashion: ‘for instance, one of the Ministers 
come out to say we support innovation in the textile industry. He has to answer why it is 
the textile [industry] but not another one. If such a decision is made, [this should be 
answered] right?’66 The extent of the ‘top-down approach’ can reach such levels that 
even the bureaucrats of the very organizations that pursue the programs are not informed 
about new developments till the very last minute.67  
 
Third, interventions to key agencies have enabled the government to pursue the policies 
as the party sees fit. To exemplify, the government preferred to relax resource allocation 
criteria in regards to R&D fund allocation to the private sector during the 2000s.68 The 
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stated goal has been to promote innovation culture throughout the society. The 
government also preferred a horizontal policy design instead of a vertical one.69 Although 
many bureaucrats and the main opposition the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had deep 
hesitations about the effectiveness of these choices, the AKP managed to pursue its 
preferences on the ground thanks to its influence over key innovation agencies.70 Last, 
politically-motivated involvements hampered the institutionalization of evidence-based 
policy-making processes. One example from TÜBİTAK illustrates the point. When 
TÜBİTAK began allocating R&D funds to the private sector in the mid-1990s for the 
first time, the organization forged mechanisms to assess value added of its support 
programs. To this end, TÜBİTAK relied on external evaluators. Although the bureaucrats 
were aware that R&D does not yield immediate results, and a certain period of time needs 
to pass to adequately measure impact, they chose to start evaluations right off the bat to 
‘establish a discipline of evaluation’ in Turkey. 71  However, the turbulent events at 
TÜBİTAK at the turn of the 2000s disturbed policy continuity. The organization neither 
furthered internal efforts to assess value-added, nor relied on external evaluators to 
conduct impact evaluation analysis in a consecutive and consistent manner. The issue of 
the monitoring and steering of the R&D funds is of utmost importance for the 
developmental states, and factors other than political interference influence the processes 
as well. Thus, the next section turns a keen eye on this particular issue.     
 
The question of monitoring and steering 
 
Performance-based monitoring and steering constitutes the second crucial aspect of a 
state’s internal capacity, as it becomes the only possible way for the state to steer 
innovation-led growth through efficient resource allocation. It is also the key component 
of evidence-based smart industrial policy design. It is no surprise that the leading 
countries on the innovation ladder all enjoy a process where evidence is gathered, 
analysed, and utilized at all stages of the policy cycle. In contrast, there have been 
significant problems with regard to evidence-based policy-making in Turkey. First, there 
is a clear absence of a state apparatus that can act as a ‘nodal agency’ to effectively steer 
the R&D fund allocation. No comprehensive agency or unit is solely devoted to the 
promotion of evidence-based policy-making processes. The units that have been created 
under the MoSIT and the Undersecretariat of Treasury are not full-fledged bodies that 
can steer the monitoring. Two bureaucrats, for instance, compared Turkey with Korea 
during the interviews to note that while in Korea performance-based monitoring is 
ensured by capable organizations that are solely dedicated to evidence-based policy-
making, in Turkey no such organization exists.72 In addition, agencies that distribute the 
funds to the private sector also fail to follow systematic performance-based criteria while 
designing their own support schemes. On the one hand, it is sometimes the case that 
organizations do not rely on indicative measures simply as a matter of choice. In one 
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case, for instance, although an organization hired an independent agency to conduct the 
impact evaluation of its support schemes, and also trained its own bureaucrats to 
effectively steer the process, the upper management opted to revise the whole support 
system before the evaluation results even appear. 73  On the other hand, problems 
associated with institutional memory hamper the institutionalization of performance-
based monitoring efforts. In some cases, bureaucrats take the initiative and make sure that 
support programs’ impacts are measured, and the outcomes are reflected in subsequent 
decision-making processes. However, once a change materializes in any organizations’ 
leading cadre, it is quite likely that a policy-discontinuity emerges. The new cadre—or 
the new high-ranking bureaucrat—is likely to ignore the previous efforts and put the 
whole monitoring project aside.74 The fact that projections and impact evaluations are 
technically difficult to perform complicates the already difficult situation. In addition to 
the shortages of human capital, disagreements among public institutions occasionally 
arise with regard to the appropriate methodology to employ during performance 
evaluations. All in all, the interview data reveal that despite the positive steps undertaken, 
the Turkish innovation system has yet to adopt a comprehensive performance-based 
monitoring system, as has been the case in successful developmental states.75   
 
One particular aspect of the policy-making culture in Turkey poses yet another difficulty 
for the institutionalization of evidence-based policy-making efforts. The interview 
evidence suggests that bureaucrats and political elites still tend to perceive impact 
evaluations as ‘punishment devices’ instead of seeing them as part of a learning process. 
There is a traditional reflex in the bureaucracy to avoid impact evaluations, since they 
think that the evaluation results can be used against organizations or units in the form of 
budget cuts. When faced with unsatisfactory results, some decision-makers can 
potentially react by saying ‘why are we allocating money to you, we can allocate more 
money to [construct] irrigation channels [instead]’.76 In some cases, political elites might 
set unrealistic goals at the outset; therefore, they might fail to appreciate the success that 
is achieved with scarce resources.77  
 
In addition to this cultural trait, a ‘considerable degree of ambiguity [existed] in the 
classifications and definitions of the benefits to which businesses [were] entitled’ during 
the 1980s and the 1990s, which led to confusion and the inefficient utilization of the 
resources.78 A similar ambiguity has certainly been existent in the R&D sector. This can 
be easily observed in the relevant R&D legislation. As an illustrative case in point, the 
first condition that is required for the establishment of a technopark in Turkey is ‘the 
presence, in the identified area or within the boundaries of the province where the [park] 
is situated, of a university...and a sufficient R&D and technological potential in the 
area’.79 Each city in Turkey has at least one university within its borders; therefore, this is 
not a criterion in practical terms. The essential criterion is the ‘sufficient R&D and 
technological potential’. In the technopark legislation, the term ‘sufficient R&D and 
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technological potential’ is not defined in concrete terms. Although a number of criteria 
are set forth that are to be taken into account while evaluating a park application, no 
concrete threshold is provided based on which the evaluations are to be done. The 
Assessment Board, which evaluates park applications, is said to determine the sufficiency 
of R&D potential.80 In this regard, a comprehensive report on technoparks in Turkey 
prepared by the State Supervisory Council notes that some of the Assessment Board’s 
decisions involve arbitrariness and contradictions.81 In some cases, some parks failed to 
start their operations for a long period of time although they obtained the Board’s initial 
approval. In other cases, although the Board rejected some applications at first, it 
approved them soon afterwards, despite the fact that the issues based on which the prior 
application was rejected remained problematic.82 The same report also dubs the ‘absence 
of criteria in resource allocation and non-distribution of resources according to needs’ 
and ‘ambiguities in the payment of the Ministry support (amount, time, method)’ as 
problems encountered in the financing of the parks’ infrastructural investments.83 Based 
on these, the Supervisory Council advised the Assessment Board to undertake a solution-
oriented analysis, conduct more detailed research before making its decisions, take 
measures to pursue objective criteria, and change the Board’s structure if need be. Similar 
ambiguities in the R&D sector exist that pose a pertinent problem for the effective 
allocation of governmental resources. 
 
As noted, the state opted to relax resource allocation criteria based on which R&D funds 
are allocated to the private sector.84 To exemplify, almost all technopark applications and 
majority of R&D center applications are approved during the AKP period. If one 
considers the fact that there have been major problems associated with evidence-based 
policy-making during the 2000s, this flexibilization in resource allocation criteria casts 
serious doubts on the effective utilization of R&D resources.85 Having said this, it is 
important to underline that many problems pertaining to monitoring and steering are 
embedded in the overall political economy structure of Turkey. These issues have been 
long-lasting,86 and they are not only observable in the R&D sector.87 In light of this, a 
bureaucrat’s statement concerning the performance-based monitoring system’s persistent 
problems in Turkey is illustrative. The example covers the technoparks’ first appearance 
in the country, as well as the subsequent development pattern: 
 
It was the time of [Turgut] Özal. Özal and his crew see a Technopark abroad. 
When they return, they decide to establish Technoparks [in Turkey]. [At the time], 
no one knew what is a Technopark, what is going on, [and] what this park is about 
[in Turkey]. Then, Turkey approaches UNIDO. She says, “Send us an expert, we 
are going to establish Technoparks... Then, experts come to Turkey and conduct a 
brief need-analysis. Then, they say [Technoparks] should be [established] in 
Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and TÜBİTAK-MAM. First, [the experts] ask us to 
establish an incubator, analyse it, and then if it becomes successful, establish a 
Technopark. This way, we would gain experience... It is OK, we start 
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[establishing incubators], [founding the required committees], but no one knows 
what is an incubator at the time. After five years, [the experts] visited Turkey once 
again to follow up on the project. They asked us, “What did you do?” We said we 
are doing like this, we are doing like that. They asked, “Where is your business 
plan? Where are your success criteria?” [We had] none of those... They asked, 
“Relying on what [plan] are you working?” [We said] we are just doing... [The 
expert] told us a very nice thing at the time. He said, “You are the descendants of 
the Ottoman Empire, do you assume that Mimar Sinan constructed the Blue 
Mosque without a plan? Did he do all those works randomly? How come you do 
not have a business plan, success criteria, etc.” Still, we do not have these today 
properly.  
 
The question of bureaucratic coordination 
 
The final element of the state’s internal capacity is the degree of coordination among 
relevant bureaucratic organizations. Interview data suggest that there have also been 
problems with bureaucratic coordination in Turkey over the 2000s, despite some positive 
steps undertaken under the auspices of single party governments. First, different state 
organizations run similar programs, which aim at similar target groups in the country. In 
some cases, organizations are aware of this fact. However, due to inter-organizational 
competition, and in the absence of a genuine pilot agency that can effectively govern the 
system similar to Korean and Japanese cases, Turkish developmental organizations 
continue to run similar programs. In other cases, organizations are not even aware of the 
fact that they administer parallel programs. 88  Overall, the absence of bureaucratic 
coordination leads to the unnecessary proliferation of governmental support programs, 
confuses the private sector due to an influx of information, fuels inter-organizational 
competition, and makes the monitoring of the programs more difficult. In fact, one 
bureaucrat likened the unnecessary proliferation of support programs in Turkey to a 
‘support jungle’.89 The issue is further aggravated given the fact that the relevant units of 
various ministries also began to allocate R&D funds to the private sector over the last 
couple of years, although in many cases these units lacked the required expertise to 
scientifically evaluate applications and steer the allocation processes. Paradoxically, 
however, the lack of coordination among bureaucratic organizations might have actually 
had some unintended positive effects in an environment where the developmental state’s 
core characteristics are not in place. In an innovation system where organizations 
continuously face the danger of becoming ineffective due to political interference or 
change in their leading cadre, and where a top-down policy-making process dominates, 
concentration of resources in few organizations might turn out to be unfortunate because 
in case organizations in question become dysfunctional for the above-mentioned reasons, 
then the entire system would face the risk of becoming dysfunctional. 90  Therefore, 
although the unnecessary proliferation of support programs clearly signal a weakness in 
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terms of state capacity, it might have a positive unintended consequence in the short run 
via an unplanned risk diversification.  
 
The issue of bureaucratic coordination has another dimension linking the state elite with 
private actors, i.e., the external dimension of state capacity. The literature suggests that 
the institutional configuration of state-business relations informs the external aspect of 
state capacity that in turn conditions the overall developmental performance. 91 
Accordingly, institutionalized cooperation mechanisms between state bureaucrats and 
business representatives—‘governed interdependence’, to use Linda Weiss’ 
terminology—help in upgrading the production and trade structure of a country towards 
the high-technology frontier. 92  From a historical perspective, however, state-business 
relations in Turkey tilted toward a ‘market-repressing’ rather than a ‘market-enhancing’ 
institutional equilibrium that hampered the creation of a transparent and rule-based 
economic environment.93 
 
The interview data suggests that weak embeddedness in state-business relations is visible 
in the Turkish innovation system as well, in a way that curtails the state’s external 
capacity. On the one hand, the business elite does not seem to be interested in 
specializing in high-tech products despite its overwhelming rhetoric on the importance of 
high-tech production and innovation. In fact, the business elite had virtually no interest in 
collaborating with the state with regard to technological upgrading in the 1990s.94 Since 
external developments such as innovation-led competition under export-oriented 
industrialization and the Customs Union with the EU forced the private sector to become 
more innovative, business firms began to take innovation seriously and showed an 
interest in establishing cooperation with the state. Nevertheless, the business is yet to 
develop or suggest a comprehensive stance on the design of the innovation policy. On the 
other hand, formal mechanisms through which the private sector can participate in the 
decision-making processes are under-institutionalized. The collaboration is rather carried 
out through informal consultations and contacts. Even though in some cases business 
organizations take a step forward to involve in the process, ad hoc attempts have not yet 
yielded concrete results.95 In Singapore, for example, a strong political leadership that 
effectively controlled power at multiple layers had to engage with a coalition of private 
interests that played an active role in the design, implementation, and monitoring of 
innovation policy. 96  This situation happened to be a safeguard against the arbitrary 
decisions of politicians, inserted credibility to the system, thus contributed to the 
emergence of development-enhancing institutions. 97  Likewise, the institutions that 
enabled the Brazilian success in sugar and ethanol were forged during the military regime 
(1964-1985), and the effective consultation of major sugar producers played a role in the 
process.98 No such mechanism has been existent in Turkey within the context of the 
R&D sector.  
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It appears that weak state-business cooperation in R&D policies is closely associated with 
the recent turn in Turkish political economy. The increasingly harsh political criticisms 
directed against TÜSİAD, Turkey’s biggest business association representing the 
mainstream capitalist establishment of the country, by the government since mid-2013 
injected a new wave of instability and polarization in the domestic political economy 
landscape, which in turn, hampered the kind of synergy needed to ensure 
developmentalist cooperation. On the other hand, the post-1980 period witnessed the 
emergence and rapid consolidation of a conservative business class vis-à-vis the 
dominant economic establishment of the country. The newly emerging business elite in 
the inlands of Turkey, the so-called Anatolian Tigers, injected new activism in industrial 
production and foreign trade. The new business elite, particularly the large-scale 
companies, took advantage of lucrative state incentives, public tenders, and extensive 
political support. However, the newly consolidating business actors have not 
demonstrated the expected performance in terms of the transformation of Turkey’s 
production structure and foreign trade composition. As Buğra and Savaşkan have 
documented in detail, the government-backed ‘new capitalist class’ mainly concentrated 
on low value-added sectors, with construction activities being the main engine of the 
expansion of their wealth. 99  The capital accumulation model over the last decade, 
therefore, increasingly relied on construction-related activities at the expense of 
technological and industrial production. It is, for obvious reasons, an arduous task to 
build a neo-developmentalist state by relying overwhelmingly on traditional non-tradable 
sectors. Thus, the current dominant growth strategy creates imminent risks in terms of 
sustainable growth and high-tech-oriented production performance. As a result, the 
discussion so far suggests that there have been certain achievements and apparent 
challenges in the Turkish economy as it still encounters structural weaknesses in terms of 
the state’s internal and external capacity.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The state’s development-enhancing role is being discussed more frequently in the 
aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis as the pendulum began to swing away from 
neoliberalism. In fact, it was already known that the countries that have pursued a 
heterodox agenda have outperformed their counterparts over the last thirty years. The 
institutional capacities that are underlined in the developmental state scholarship have 
indeed turned out to be crucial. Be that as it may, the 21st century’s socio-economic 
conditions led to a re-examination of the developmental state and necessitated a re-
calibration of the state’s role in the contemporary bit-driven economy.100 Thus, whereas 
the first question has been whether the developmental state is still relevant for today’s 
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latecomers, the second question has been what additional challenges the states face in the 
new millennium. This article speaks to both discussions by providing an in-depth 
elaboration of the Turkish case. First, the core traits of the developmental state are still 
relevant as ever. The state’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ capacities –manifested in 
bureaucratic autonomy, ‘expended embeddedness,’ Weberian bureaucracy, the 
prevalence of evidence-based policy-making mechanisms, and bureaucratic coordination, 
are crucial for the effective capitalization of the regulatory changes and the 
developmental attempts. As the Turkish case revealed, even though the governments 
have taken certain steps to institutionalize the developmental mentality in the R&D 
sector, those attempts could not contribute to effective policy-making due to the inherent 
problems in state capacity. Relatedly, the bureaucracy’s autonomy vis-à-vis the political 
leadership is of utmost importance. The political leadership’s interferences with key 
innovation agencies have undermined the Turkish state’s capacity by (i) curtailing the 
institutionalization of evidence-based policy-making efforts, (ii) hampering the 
emergence of a Weberian bureaucracy, and (iii) undermining the formation of long-term 
policies.101  
 
The problems outlined in regards to the Turkish state’s transformative capacity in the 
R&D sector not only represent a continuum with the country’s past,102 but also mimic the 
shortcomings that are examined in different policy domains during the 2000s.103  In-
depth elaboration of the Turkish state’s transformative capacity in the R&D sector also 
suggests that populist tendencies have existed in the country during the formulation and 
implementation of R&D policies. Flexibilization in resource allocation criteria and 
lowering of expectations on R&D investments in the face of major monitoring and 
steering problems and the dominance of a top-down policy-making approach constitute 
the main characteristics of this approach.104 In fact, the evidence suggests that the current 
approach to R&D fund allocation as populist in nature by primarily emphasizing the 
proliferation of resources in the absence of impact evaluation mechanisms. 
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